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In light of the Productivity Commission’s inquiry into Australia’s consumer policy 
framework and administration, this article explores three assumptions that have 
underpinned our consumer protection framework to date: assumptions about the 
benefits of competition, self-regulation, and information. It argues that the benefits 
can be over-stated, and do not always reflect the reality of consumer experience. The 
article calls for the development of an overarching framework or principles document, 
with a more moderated approach to competition, self-regulation and information. 
While the Productivity Commission’s draft report has admirably dealt with many of 
these issues, there is scope for the proposed objectives and recommendations in the 
final report to reflect more consistently the disparate impact of markets and 




On 11 December 2006, the former Commonwealth Treasurer, Peter Costello, 
announced that the Productivity Commission would conduct an inquiry into 
Australia’s consumer policy framework and administration. This inquiry has been the 
first comprehensive review of consumer policy in Australia since the primary 
consumer protection instrument, the Commonwealth Trade Practices Act, was 
introduced in 1974. It has provided an opportunity to develop and expand our 
thinking in consumer policy, and to learn from other jurisdictions that have made 
consumer policy a high priority in recent years. Ultimately, this inquiry has provided 
the opportunity to consider what a world class consumer policy might look like in 
Australia. 
 
While the potential scope of the inquiry was very large, the Productivity Commission 
has taken a high level approach, focusing on key institutional and procedural aspects 
of the policy framework, and in a regulatory sense, on the generic provisions in the 
Trade Practices Act and the Fair Trading Acts of the States and Territories.1  
 
The inquiry has also examined the rationales and objectives for consumer policy, and 
the assumptions that underlie decisions in this area. This is a fertile ground for 
discussion. For example, how should we balance the tensions between free markets, 
consumer empowerment, buyer beware, and consumer protection? What role do 
competition, self-regulation, disclosure and consumer education play in our consumer 
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policy framework? These are all large questions, and a consensus response is not easy 
to find. But they are crucial issues to grapple with in this inquiry. 
 
In this article, I explore three assumptions that have underpinned our consumer 
protection framework to date: assumptions about the benefits of competition, self-
regulation, and information. I discuss the importance of developing an overarching 
principle or framework to guide policy makers and others, and discuss the possible 
content of such a framework in light of the limitations of current approaches 
discussed in the article. Finally, I briefly discuss the Productivity Commission’s draft 
report, and the extent to which this report has considered these assumptions and the 
need for an overarching principle, and reflected them in the draft recommendations. 
 
 
Assumption 1: Competitive markets are the primary bulwark for consumer 
protection 
 
Many discussions about consumer policy start with an assertion that, most of the time, 
competitive markets are the main vehicle for delivering consumer welfare, and 
(implicitly) consumer policy.2 Once markets are competitive, so the argument goes, 
the competitive process will weed out unfair practices, excessive prices, and poor 
quality. Moreover, well informed consumers will drive the competitive process. In 
other words, competition is the goal because it enhances consumer welfare; it is not a 
goal in and of itself.  
 
The consumer and community benefits of having competitive markets are significant, 
and initiatives to increase competition, and restrict anti-competitive conduct, are often 
warranted. However, there are some limitations on the ability of competition to 
provide consumer benefits.  
 
First, where there are market failures, such as information asymmetries between 
consumers and traders, competition is less effective for consumers. In many cases, 
disclosure regulation is introduced to overcome information problems. However, if 
disclosure documents are not read, the information problem remains. For example, if 
consumers do not read contracts, what incentive is there for traders to compete on 
delivering contracts with fair terms? Even if consumers read parts of a contract, their 
bias to optimism may reduce the extent to which they examine (and make a choice 
based on) terms about contingencies, such as default. In addition, if information is 
disclosed, but is not easily comparable, it can also have a marginal effect on 
competition.  
 
Second, the effectiveness of competition can often be marginal where goods or 
services are essential, and the consumer is in a poor bargaining position. Markets and 
traders are not altruistic. This is particularly apparent in the case of essential goods or 
services. Markets and traders are unlikely to provide essential goods or services, at 
affordable prices, if it is not in their financial interest to do so, and the concept of a 
safety net is not a naturally occurring feature of markets.  
 
Third, there can be biases introduced by trader practices, including incentives to offer 
particular choices over others, or to sell more than might be desirable from the 
consumer’s perspective. In some cases, there is even reverse competition, where – for 
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example – product sellers compete (by offering higher commissions or other benefits) 
to be included on the referral list of a third party adviser. Those costs are ultimately 
passed on to the consumer.  
 
Finally, competition models often work best in relation to the sale of goods, where the 
features and attributes are on display, and there is a consistency between all units of a 
particular model. However, consumers increasingly spend their money on services,3 
rather than goods. Services can often be more empheral in nature, individualised or 
customised, where the effectiveness of the choice is not immediately apparent.  
 
As a result of these and other limitations, policy makers need to be wary of relying 
primarily on competition to drive consumer outcomes, at least in some markets and 
for some consumers.  
 
Consumer law and policy should not be seen as merely a subset of, or a second cousin 
to, competition law and policy – it should be treated as an equal partner in the 
regulation of markets. 
 
Therese Wilson and I have described the relationship in the following way: 
 
Competition law and consumer law are related, and are both equally important 
to the effective operation of markets in the interests of the community as a 
whole. The key here is the equal importance of the two aspects of law. Giving 
effective priority to competition, as appears to be the current approach of the 
[then] Commonwealth Government, risks ignoring the needs and realities of 
many consumers, to the ultimate detriment of the community as a whole.  
 
Consumer law and policy should not be a secondary consideration for 
Governments. It should be a high level priority in its own right. Responding 
effectively to consumer issues requires us to acknowledge the strengths and 
limitations of both competition law and consumer law; to articulate the 
problems and their genesis; and to identify one or more solutions without 
being blinkered by the mantra that competitive markets are always the 
answer.4 
 
Companies should be given every opportunity to develop effective corporate social 
responsibility programs and initiatives to address market failures and social 
objectives. However, it is not appropriate to rely solely on markets and competition to 
deliver structures and frameworks that ensure fair and safe outcomes for all 
consumers. This is the proper role of government and regulation. 
 
 
Assumption 2: If competitive markets don’t protect consumers, self-regulation is 
the next best thing (and relatedly, regulation is a very last resort) 
 
A focus on competition as delivering consumer policy can often be accompanied with 
declarations of the virtues of self-regulation for consumer policy. Self-regulation is 
promoted as cheaper as and more flexible than government regulation, and it is argued 
that industry ownership of self-regulatory initiatives results in a greater commitment.5  
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However, examples of successful self-regulatory initiatives are few and far between, 
particularly in the rule-setting arena (industry codes of practice). The more effective 
initiatives have largely been limited to industry segments with most or all of the 
following characteristics: 
 
• a relatively small number of members;  
• maturity;  
• openness to government and consumer involvement in development and 
review of the code;  
• effective mechanisms for compliance and redress;  
• codes that go beyond the requirements of the law; and  
• codes that are backed up by access to internal and external dispute 
resolution.  
 
In the financial services sector, effective (although not perfect) examples include the 
Code of Banking Practice, the General Insurance Code of Practice, and the Electronic 
Funds Transfer Code of Conduct.  
 
A more consistently successful form of self-regulation in Australia has been the 
development of industry-based external dispute resolutions schemes, particularly in 
energy and financial services. Again, these schemes are not perfect, but they can be an 
important mechanism for increasing access to justice for many consumer disputes. 
Nor are they completely self-regulatory – in some sectors, the schemes have the 
backing of the regulatory framework,6 and it is arguable that this is a key feature of 
their success.  
 
Self-regulation can work in some, limited, circumstances. However, the 
characteristics of many consumer markets and submarkets are such that widespread 
adoption of self-regulation is unlikely to meet consumer policy objectives. 
 
 
Assumption 3: Give consumers information and financial literacy, and they will 
be able to look after themselves 
 
Underlying many of the consumer policy decisions in Australia has also been a 
dominant belief in the value of information. In particular, there has been a focus on 
disclosure as a regulatory tool, and a related emphasis on consumer and financial 
literacy. This follows from the assumptions about the welfare benefits of competition. 
By giving consumers information and education, they will be able to navigate through 
offers and options, apply a rational cost-benefit analysis, and their desire for self-
maximisation in economic terms will thus drive competition.  This is the rational 
consumer for whom much consumer policy is made.  
 
The findings of behavioural economists, however, display a more sophisticated 
understanding of consumer behaviour that supports our intuitive sense that more and 
more disclosure is unlikely to be the answer.  For example, behavioural economists 
show that: 
 
• Behaviour and decisions can be influenced by the way in which choices are 
framed: ‘If options are framed in terms of possible losses, risk aversion tends to 
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dominate; if options are framed in terms of possible gains people are more likely 
to take up those options.’ 
• Some behaviours depend upon the way in which choices are framed (suggesting 
that consumer preferences are not stable).  
• People find it very difficult to estimate probabilities, and have a general difficulty 
in assessing the risk of very low probabilities. 
• People are reluctant to sell or give up a good that they already own (endowment, 
or status quo bias). 
• In the face of many choices, people can choose not to choose, and opt out of 
search and comparison activities. 
• The order in which options are presented can influence choice (default bias).7  
 
 
We also know that many consumers simply do not have the skills or aptitude to 
navigate through complex disclosure documents.8 These and other findings should 
warn policy makers away from an over-reliance on disclosure responses to consumer 
problems. 
 
In relation to financial literacy initiatives in Australia, there continues to be a focus on 
providing information (rather than education) through brochures and websites.9 
However, effective financial literacy initiatives for both adults and young people are 
often more costly than information campaigns, and are a long-term strategy. Intensive, 
face to face programs, like those associated with savings programs or low interest 
loan schemes appear to have successes in improving financial literacy, particularly for 
those most in need or at risk.10  
 
In fact, it may be that, for this group in particular, the practical one-on-one services 
provided by financial counsellors, although not identified as financial literacy, will 
often have an equivalent or greater impact on financial literacy than government or 
industry sponsored initiatives because the information and skills are provided at a 
relevant time. However, financial counsellors are stretched by crisis assistance, and 
have little scope for engaging in more proactive, early intervention work.11  
 
Disclosure and financial and consumer literacy are important, and should continue to 
be a key component of the consumer policy framework. There is no need to abandon 
disclosure as a regulatory tool.12 It is crucial that policy makers keep experimenting 
and adjusting disclosure requirements, and pre-test proposed changes,13 to ensure that 
they are as effective and useful as possible. However, before using disclosure in any 
individual instance, policy makers should first be asking: is this a problem for which 
disclosure can provide a practical solution? 
 
Similarly, there may be a need to refocus some consumer and financial literacy 
initiatives so that there is less of a reliance on brochures and specific knowledge 
(which can fade over time), and a greater focus on skills, confidence and capacity. In 
addition, disclosure and education/literacy initiatives should not be used as a 
replacement for the more specific conduct or transaction regulation where this is 
needed to protect consumers.  
 
 
Finding a new approach – a rationale for consumer policy in Australia 
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Facilitating competitive markets, and implementing effective disclosure/financial 
literacy initiatives should continue to be an important part of consumer policy. 
However, in light of the discussion above, policy makers should be wary of placing 
undue weight on the outcomes that can be achieved through these policy instruments 
or objectives. 
 
There is also a need to clarify the rationale and purpose of consumer policy and 
consumer protection regulation. To date, there has not been an overarching, clearly 
articulated rationale for consumer protection in Australia. Louise Sylvan, Deputy 
Chair of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, has noted that, with 
the exception of regulation to stop consumers being misled: 
 
Other consumer protection regulation, while plentiful and much of which is 
crucial, is not woven together into a well-structured pattern.14 
 
While the goals for competition law are clear, consumer protection instruments across 
Australia vary in their objectives and scope and in some cases, objectives and rules 
can be inconsistent, even within the same instrument. For example, a tension often 
exists between objectives that require pre-contract disclosure to facilitate comparison 
shopping between products and providers, and objectives that seek to promote 
flexibility in product/service design. This is because permitting flexibility and 
variation in product design can often reduce comparability between products.15   
 
These tensions might be resolved, or at least better managed, if Australia were to 
adopt an overarching principles document, setting out the rationale, expectations and 
even limitations of consumer policy. Such a document could be used by governments 
(Commonwealth, State, and Territory), industry and consumers to develop, implement 
and assess consumer policy instruments and initiatives, and could ensure greater 
consistency and coherence between various instruments and judicial decision making. 
Other jurisdictions have such instruments to guide their policy making and 
administration, including New Zealand16 and the United Kingdom.17 
 
What should such a document look like in Australia? 
 
Firstly, a principles document should reflect a rights-based approach. This is 
appropriate because, overall, consumers suffer from an inequality in bargaining power 
when compared to traders, and as discussed above, market mechanisms cannot 
necessarily be relied upon to ensure that this inequality in bargaining power is not 
exploited. 
 
Eight consumer rights have been articulated by the international consumer movement:  
 
• The right to satisfaction of basic needs.  
• The right to safety.  
• The right to information.  
• The right to choice. 
• The right to representation.  
• The right to redress.  
• The right to consumer education. 
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• The right to a healthy environment.18 
 
Implementing and ensuring practical access to these rights should be the cornerstone 
of the consumer policy principles document for Australia.  
 
Secondly, developing a principles document will also required engagement with the 
tension between a liberalist approach, that simply provides information and gives 
consumers the opportunity to make their own choices, and an approach that seeks to 
provide protection, particularly to those who are vulnerable or at risk of exploitation, 
by preventing some choices from being made, or preventing some products or 
services from being offered in the market.  
 
The former approach is consistent with the emphasis of government initiatives in 
recent years, as discussed above. The latter approach is often categorised, rather 
negatively, as more paternalistic. However, this approach can and should be viewed in 
a more positive sense, as one that prevents unfair practices and exploitative behaviour, 
prevents harm, and protects individuals (and the community) from decisions that have 
unforeseen consequences. The fact that consumer decision making is much less 
‘rational’ in the economic sense than has been assumed, and that decisions are very 
much dependent on framing and context (which can be manipulated), and are made 
under conditions of bounded rationality, makes a stronger case for a paternalistic 
approach in appropriate circumstances.19 It is not always possible to outline these 
circumstances in the abstract, however, intervention can be appropriate in order to 
prevent harm (as in the case of product safety), to prevent exploitation, and to ensure 
fairness and social justice objectives are met, particularly in the context of essential 
services.  
 
Third, the principles document should encompass fairness and social justice goals. 
Fairness (or a lack of unfairness) is increasingly the test used in modern consumer 
policy instruments. Examples include the Victorian unfair contract terms legislation20  
(modelled on a European Directive); industry dispute resolution schemes that include 
‘fairness in all the circumstances’ in their decision making criteria;21 and the promises 
in the Code of Banking Practice to treat customers ‘fairly and honestly’.22  
 
Consumers also value notions of fairness, and this is expressed through concern over 
the very high prices that some consumers pay for consumer credit; and at what often 
is seen as unjustifiable profit-taking in the price of petrol. This sense of fairness 
persists even if there might be a valid economic reason for the high cost (ie in terms 
of supply and demand, or the costs of provision).23 
 
Social justice and distributional concerns should also be explicitly acknowledged in a 
consumer policy framework document for Australia. Social justice, distributive justice 
and fairness are intrinsically linked. Such an approach is often criticised, on the basis 
that distributional goals are best achieved through social policy, rather than consumer 
policy. However, in practice, social welfare programs are decreasing, rather than 
increasing, and in any case, this criticism fails to acknowledge that the existing 




“Unregulated markets” do not exist because all markets have ground rules, 
whether they be the common law of property and contract or a statutory 
framework, which specify the extent to which individuals are able to take 
advantage of others in the market.24 
 
A consumer policy principles document for Australia should therefore explicitly 
acknowledge and reflect the importance of consumer rights, fairness, and social and 
distributive justice, and should pay particular attention to the needs of consumers who 
are particularly vulnerable or disadvantaged in consumer markets. The document 
should incorporate the following elements: 
 
• Facilitating and supporting universal access to essential services on a fair 
and reasonable basis, including through pricing mechanisms, but also 
through specific consumer protection measures such as fair practices in the 
event of default or non-payment.  
• Protecting consumers from exploitation, unfair practices and unsafe goods 
and services. 
• Facilitating the development of skills, confidence and capacity to make 
effective choices, and to identify and avoid unfair practices.  
• Providing clear, concise, comparable and timely information on products 
and services. 
• Ensuring access to redress and effective independent complaints and 
dispute resolution processes. 
 
In implementing particular policy responses consistent with these principles, costs and 
benefits will need to be assessed and given appropriate weight. However, this should 
be accompanied by a broader understanding of the non-economic costs and benefits 
(of acting and of not acting) than has previously been the case. Regulatory approaches 
that implement these broader goals for consumer policy should not be dismissed 
solely on the grounds they interfere with ‘natural’ or ‘neutral’ market operations.  
 
 
The Productivity Commission’s draft report 
 
The Productivity Commission’s draft report was released in November 2007. The 
report is long – over 400 pages – and covers a wide ground, as you would expect 
given the scope of the inquiry. Draft recommendations cover the generic consumer 
protection law, the administrative framework, decision-making on consumer policy, 
and enforcement and remedies; as well as covering some industry specific issues.  
 
Importantly, on the big picture issues, the Productivity Commission acknowledges the 
lack of clear objectives for the consumer policy framework to date, and that this has 
impaired the effectiveness of the consumer policy framework.25 The draft report 
explicitly recognises social justice rationales and the relevance of fairness for a 
consumer policy.26 It also acknowledges the relevance of a rights-based approach 
(although it suggests that the latter is simply an alternative ‘point of entry’ to the 
discussion).27  
 
The Draft Report does acknowledge some of the limitations flowing from 
competition, self-regulation, and information approaches. For example, in relation to 
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competition, the Draft Report contains a detailed discussion of behavioural economics 
and the implications of these findings for a consumer policy based on a competition 
approach. However, the Draft Report also argues that competition benefits most 
consumers,28 and that effective market competition is ‘the most important safeguard 
for consumers’29 (emphasis added). This approach potentially leads to an outcome 
that competition is seen as the end game in itself.30  
 
In relation to self-regulation, the draft report notes the various advantages and 
disadvantages of self-regulation, and suggests that self-regulation ‘may provide a less 
prescriptive approach to augmenting general consumer protection regulation than 
‘black-letter’ specific regulation.31 However, it fails to identify the circumstances in 
which self-regulation may be appropriate or beneficial for consumers. It also suggests 
that self-regulation could be used even if recalcitrant players cannot be dealt with.32 
 
On disclosure regulation, the draft report notes that ‘more information is not always 
better’,33 and that while disclosure regulation should continue to play a role in 
consumer policy, it must be carefully designed to ensure that it is helpful to 
consumers.34  The draft report specifically recommends greater use of consumer 
testing of proposed disclosure requirements, and introducing a layered approach to the 
delivery of complex information.35 This approach is welcomed. However, what is also 
needed in the regulatory sense is an examination at the outset as to whether 
disclosure, however well-designed and layered, is the right answer to a particular 
problem.  
 
In discussing consumer education and financial literacy, the draft report suggests that 
there has been insufficient evaluation of existing programs to assess the best 
approach,36 and recommends a cross-jurisdictional evaluation of the effectiveness of 
consumer education measures. Such an evaluation is important, given the increasing 
importance (and level of funding) given to this issue by governments, regulators and 
industry.  
 
The draft report also explicitly recommends that a common overarching objective for 
consumer policy be developed to guide and shape Australia’s consumer policy 
framework. The proposed objective and six supporting principles are set out below: 
 
Overarching objective:  
 
‘to promote the confident and informed participation of consumers in 





The consumer policy framework should efficiently and effectively aim to: 
• ensure that consumers are sufficiently well-informed to benefit from, 
and stimulate effective competition; 
• ensure that goods and services are safe and fit for the purposes for 
which they were sold; 
• prevent practices that are unfair or contrary to good faith; 
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• meet the needs of those who, as consumers, are most vulnerable, or at 
greatest disadvantage; 
• provide accessible and timely redress where consumer detriment has 
occurred; and 
• promote proportionate, risk-based enforcement.’37  
 
While the content of the proposed objective and principles are, in the main, 
‘uncontroversial’,38 it is here that the Commission could have made greater strides to 
overcoming the limitations of the competition, self-regulation, and disclosure 
paradigm of recent years. For example, the proposed overarching and operational 
objectives could be improved by: 
 
• putting consumer welfare as the objective (rather than the mechanisms for 
achieving consumer welfare);39 
• explicitly recognising consumer rights; 
• ensuring that references to competition are to effective competition;  
• introducing objectives in relation to the development of the skills and 
confidence of consumers to benefit from effective competition, and also, by 
their choices in the market, to encourage competition; 
• including a reference to the importance of understanding how consumers 
actually behave, and developing policies that acknowledge this behaviour.  
 
The specific inclusion of a reference to the needs of vulnerable and disadvantaged 
consumers in the proposed operational objectives is important, however, the final 
report of the inquiry could usefully explore the mechanisms by which this can be 
achieved, and how the tension between empowerment and protection approaches can 
be resolved. In particular, consideration is needed of what is the best policy response 
where meeting the needs of one group of consumers treads on the needs of another. 
Neither the objectives nor the proposed policy making decision tree40 explicitly 
address this issue in the draft report. 
 
Finally, the Inquiry could usefully recommend the development and adoption of a 
more detailed strategy, which details the initiatives through which the objectives will 





The current inquiry into consumer policy is long overdue, and the draft report released 
by the Productivity Commission does an admirable job of exploring the issues and 
developing proposals for a modern, effective framework that puts consumer interests 
at its heart. However, the report continues to reflect an underlying assumption that 
competition and information are the primary goals of consumer policy. It is hoped that 
in the final report, the Commission will do more to examine the disparate impact of 
markets and competition on consumers, particularly where risk is increasingly moved 
to consumers41 and the practical implications of the findings of behavioural 
economists. The results of this examination should be reflected in the overarching 
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